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STABILIZING CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS
Washington, DC—A new Institute study by Senior Fellow John Williamson concludes 
that a series of new policy actions by creditor and debtor countries could curb at least 
some of the volatility in capital ﬂ  ows that causes so many problems for emerging 
market economies and investors alike. In Curbing the Boom-Bust Cycle: Stabilizing 
Capital Flows to Emerging Markets, he proposes several initiatives with this aim:
•  Emerging markets should limit, and perhaps ultimately eliminate, foreign 
currency borrowing by their governments. These governments should instead 
start issuing inﬂ  ation-indexed and plain vanilla bonds on their local markets, 
and growth-linked bonds on the international market. A growth-linked bond 
pays an interest rate that varies with the growth rate of the domestic economy. 
For example, a country with a normal average growth rate of 4 percent a year 
and an ability to borrow at 7 percent could issue a bond that promised to pay 
7 percent plus or minus the differential of realized growth over 4 percent (plus 
a premium if that were needed to persuade investors to buy such bonds). This 
would mean that the country would pay more when growth was strong and the 
country was in a position to pay more, and would pay less when times were 
difﬁ  cult.•  Emerging-market governments should also discourage their private-sector 
borrowers and lenders from issuing and holding assets denominated in foreign 
currency since currency mismatches in debtor countries aggravate crises. This 
might be accomplished by imposing higher taxes on interest earned on foreign-
currency assets than on interest from domestic-currency denominated assets, or by 
limiting the tax concessions on interest on borrowing that is denominated in 
foreign rather than domestic currency.  
•  A switch in the lending policies of the multilateral development banks (MDBs), 
designed to eliminate currency mismatches in the borrowing of emerging markets 
from the MDBs. These banks should borrow in a synthetic currency unit whose 
value is defined by a basket of emerging-market currencies indexed to the 
countries’ own price levels (CPIs). They could then largely avoid currency 
exposure by lending to emerging markets in their own currencies, on an indexed 
basis, in roughly the same proportions that the basket is composed. 
•  Commercial banks in creditor (as well as debtor) countries should switch their 
provisioning rules to a forward-looking basis. Under this system, a bank making a 
loan adopts provisions based on past historical experience of loan defaults at the 
time when a loan is first made, rather than waiting for evidence that the particular 
borrower or individual loan is in difficulty before any provision is made. This 
avoids pressure to cut back lending, and thus aggravate recession, at times of 
difficulty. 
•  Emerging markets ought to retain the right to use capital controls in certain 
situations, especially where they are being flooded with excessive capital inflows. 
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reserve requirements (on the Chilean model); (b) the taxation of capital flows; or 
(c) creation of a parallel foreign exchange market through which pension funds 
and mutual funds would be obliged to channel their transactions. 
 
These are the main policy recommendations that Dr. Williamson advocates to 
ameliorate the costs that the volatility in capital flows imposes on both debtors and 
creditors. The costs to debtors are obvious in the business cycles that have in recent years 
been largely a reflection of capital flows and the crises that have often followed a sudden 
stop to capital inflows. But there are also important costs to creditors, who lose large 
sums of money during crisis episodes.  
One way of avoiding the costs of crises provoked by variations in capital flows 
might be to repress the capital flows, but this would be to forego the benefits—of 
reallocating capital to areas where its return is higher, of risk diversification, and of 
enhanced access to intellectual property—that capital mobility can bring. The study seeks 
instead to develop an agenda of policy proposals to limit the fluctuations in capital flows 
and the costs that these variations bring in their train. 
In addition to the main proposals outlined above, several more technical proposals 
are developed: 
•  The reported maturity of bonds ought to be calculated until any put option—i.e., 
any clause that gives the lender the right to demand his money back before the 
loan expires—falls due. This might discourage lenders from inserting such 
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borrowed funds, into bond contracts. 
•  Insurance companies ought not to be forced to sell bonds that may have been 
downgraded during a crisis. Ideally they should be allowed to decide for 
themselves what is in the best interests of their policyholders, as the “prudent man 
rule” permits, but at the least any regulations ought to govern what they buy rather 
than what they hold. 
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